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LADB News Analyst Under a calendar developed in May, the Salvadoran government and the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) were to have concluded a cease-fire agreement
by this week. An escalation of the conflict seems a more likely scenario in the wake of the impasse
over demilitarization. The seriousness of the talks which opened last April, and the protocols
and agreements reached in Geneva, Caracas and San Jose during the first three rounds, raised
expectations in El Salvador and elsewhere for a quick resolution of the conflict. Negotiations
to end armed conflict, however, are rarely smooth processes leading to quick settlements. The
backdrop to such deliberations consists of shifts in relative political and military advantages which
define pace, prospects, and terms. Consequently, peace through negotiations is often marked by
transitory agreements, temporary setbacks and lapses into conflict escalation. In addition, the
process may be effectively postponed when either side concludes that a change in its military or
political position is possible or necessary to continue negotiations. In the Salvadoran case, both
sides are under considerable pressure to reach a negotiated settlement, and neither is gaining or
losing significant advantages relative to the other. In evaluating the Salvadoran peace talks, more
attention should be focused on underlying conditions toward a negotiating dynamic than on the
pace of concrete progress from round to round. Prospects for Salvadoran Negotiations Conditions
for a negotiated solution have emerged only recently. The combination and accumulation of
factors making negotiations a realistic option follow: * Military stalemate. The rebel offensive
of late 1989 demonstrated that the FMLN continues to be a formidable opponent with offensive
capacity and operational flexibility. After 10 years of war, military defeat of the rebels is not yet
possible. Meanwhile, the Salvadoran army's response to the offensive also showed that it was
capable of defending itself. * Changes in regional and international context. The regional peace
process initiated in 1987 and later the Nicaraguan elections, have given an impetus to Salvadoran
negotiations. The virtual end of the cold war removes the East-West ideological prism from the
conflict, and thus lowers the international stakes involved in compromises on either side. The role
of the United Nations as mediator raises the ante of withdrawing by either side and brings focused
pressure from the international community. * Increased participation of civilian opposition forces.
Defeat of the Christian Democrats in national elections, and the emergence of a "grass-roots"
coalition calling for democratization have contributed in different ways to applying pressure on both
sides to negotiate an end to the war. Religious and community groups, trade unions, journalists,
political parties, and university faculty and students, among others, have claimed an independent
role in supporting a negotiated peace. * Change in strategy and policy within the FMLN, 1987 to
present. Rebel leaders have refashioned objectives to a realistic assessment of what is possible in El
Salvador. The FMLN's articulated vision of political competition and distribution of power among
diverse social sectors, within a context of progressive social change and justice, leaves room for
elites to seek accommodation. It also provides ideological and political "space" for Washington to
learn to live with a situation in El Salvador other than the status quo ante. * Disagreements among
factions of El Salvador's rulers. The fate of the economic elite(s) is no longer closely linked to that of
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the military. Divergent positions and support for negotiations are engendered by prolongation of
the conflict, changes in US policy, and recognition that "concertacion" is a necessary precursor to
realizing political and economic stability. * US policy. The defeat of the Christian Democrats, failure
of the military's counterinsurgency campaign, the impact of the FMLN offensive last November,
the slaying of the Jesuit priests, and the deprioritization of Central America have weakened support
in Washington for the Salvadoran regime. For the first time, the US Congress is apparently willing
to place conditions on military aid to the Salvadoran government. US intervention in the civil
war has prolonged the conflict, but it has also given Washington the means to apply effective
pressure on the Salvadoran government. The Military "Cancer" An impasse developed in the
fourth round of talks precisely because the FMLN addressed the very crux of the issue of war and
peace in El Salvador with its proposals for demilitarization. Electoral, judicial and constitutional
reforms become relatively minor points of discussion in comparison to military matters. Since 1980,
the Salvadoran military has become a nearly autonomous institution, in contrast to its previous
status of dependence on political and economic elites for power and privilege. Fueled by over $1
billion in US aid, the Salvadoran military has grown into a medusean network of corruption and
patronage. The spoils of a lucrative war have spawned an untouchable empire, beyond the control
of any civilian government. The military permeates all spheres of Salvadoran society. During the
1980s, the armed forces established their own financial institutions, shopping malls, industrial and
agricultural enterprises. The military is currently one of El Salvador's largest real estate brokers.
As one observer put it, "the 14 warlords have replaced the 14 families." From an alliance with the
oligarchy, the armed forces are moving to a total dictatorship over all sectors of society, including
the ruling party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). This dictatorship is expressed
precisely in the militarization of society. The armed forces exercise control from the highest echelons
of the national government's decision-making to the local community level (excepting where
the FMLN constitutes an alternative power). The military is omnipresent, and not accountable to
anyone but itself. The military elite is the only sector of Salvadoran society that would gain little or
nothing, and has a lot to lose, in the event of a negotiated peace settlement. According to US Sen.
Christopher Dodd, "The principal obstacle is the armed forces. There will be no peace, no justice, no
democracy in El Salvador so long as the army and the security forces can act with impunity. Military
reform is essential for the success of talks." Many Salvadorans and foreign observers argue that
because the armed forces are beyond reform, the important military issue in the peace talks is not
merely military impunity, but rather demilitarization of society from the national to village level.
The October 1979 coup the last significant attempt at military reform from within demonstrated
that the military is not capable of democratizing itself. Ten years later, the massacre of the Jesuits
sealed its illegitimacy. A type of consensus in El Salvador is emerging around the perception of the
military elite as "social cancer." This underlying recognition explains the impasse at the last round
of talks, and accompanying tight-lipped statements by government officials and military officers
asserting that the "military as institution" is not negotiable. The FMLN's proposal, calling for the
"disappearance of the two armies through a gradual, symmetrical and simultaneous process,"
is indeed "maximalist" in form. However, negotiators typically put forward more than they are
willing to settle for; reaching compromise from a starting point of maximum demands is the art of
negotiations. In content, the issue is not the quantitative question of troop numbers or elimination
of this or that security force, but rather the disappearance of the military elite's hegemonic role in
society and corresponding dismantlement of a privileged, repressive class. Demilitarization means
the rebirth of civil society. Who Will Force the Military's Hand? One source of pressure on the
armed forces elite to begin serious discussion of demilitarization is the melange of independent
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"grass-roots" actors. Although the FMLN's maximalist proposal was described as "excessive" by
Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chavez, he acknowledged that military impunity is the major
obstacle to a negotiated solution. The broad-based Comision Permanente para el Debate Nacional
(CPDN) and Salvadoran trade union organizations publicly expressed support for the essence
of the rebel proposal, while also voicing certain criticisms. Such social pressure as a single factor
is unlikely to bring the military around. Moreover, challenge from the grass-roots may trigger
yet another cycle of violent repression. Under certain conditions, President Alfredo Cristiani's
administration, along with economic and political elites, may challenge the military. The military
elite has placed constraints on the national government's ability to exercise its decision-making
prerogatives, and carry out policy initiatives. A challenge to military hegemony from Cristiani et al.
could develop if the former decides that its political and economic survival requires separation from
the military. To date, however, Cristiani has bowed to the military every time it has challenged the
president's authority. Recent military appointments have strengthened the concentration of power
within the hands of the 1966 "Tandona," considered the most corrupt and principal repository
of true believers in military hegemony of society. Gen. Rafael Humberto Larios was replaced by
Emilio Ponce as Defense Minister. Cols. Mauricio Vargas and Gilberto Rubio were named chiefof-staff, and second in command. Larios was appointed last year to the ministry post as a neutral
compromise, in part because he had no identifiable base of support within the military. Although
risky and unreliable, a third source of potential challenge to the military is the US government. For
instance, the Guatemalan military responded to such pressures from the Carter administration by
strengthening its resolve, and becoming more independent from the US. The Guatemalan armed
forces did not relinquish any power, or become less repressive. US pressure alone will probably not
force the military into negotiating away some of its power and privilege, especially considering that
any such action by Washington is circumscribed by its determination to keep progressive forces
at bay. The final pressure point against the military comes from the FMLN. Threats of a renewed
offensive are clearly intended to show the military that it has no choice but to compromise. An
essential ingredient for the success of any negotiations process is conviction by both sides that the
adversary has sufficient strength to resist any solution other than negotiations. Commander Joaquin
Villalobo's recent assertion that the rebel "veto power" is the surest guarantee for demilitarization
and democratization of society appears in this light less as rhetoric than a statement of the FMLN's
pivotal position vis-a-vis the military and its posture at the negotiating table. The combination of
the above sources of applied pressure is bound to exacerbate divisions and disagreements within
the Salvadoran officer corps, and perhaps between the officer corps and the troops. How all of these
factors may add or detract from a negotiated settlement to the civil war remains to be seen. One
possibility is a new polarization, or Salvadoran society versus the military.
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